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THE RELATION OF ENGLISH LAW TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
By W ILLIAm S. HOLDSWORTH*
I HAvE dealt with the early history of this topic in the tenth
volume of my History of English Law. I need not, therefore,
do more than summarize what I have there written as a pre-
liminary to a discussion of the modern English law on this topic.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this question had
not begun to be considered by the common lawyers. The rules of
international law were regarded as matters which concerned the
Crown, and fell within its wide prerogative in relation to foreign
affairs.' But after the Revolution it was necessary to reconcile this
wide prerogative with the principles of English constitutional
law which had prevailed as the result of the Revolution. One of
these principles was that the prerogative could not be used in any
way which conflicted with those principles. This restriction on
the prerogative of the Crown in relation to foreign affairs is
recognised at the present day, and has affected the development
and the content of some of its branches-notably the treaty-
making power. It also affected this question of the relation of
English to international law, since the judges, if asked to give
effect to a rule of international law, might be obliged to con-
sider whether it conflicted with a rule of English law by which
they were bound.
The episode of the arrest of the Czar's ambassador in 1708
raised this question of the relation of the rules of international
law to the common law.2 The particular question at issue-the
*Vinerian Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
110 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 369-370.
210 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 370-373.
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immunity of ambassadors-was settled by statute. But it is clear
from cases arising later in the century, which turned upon the
construction of this statute, that this episode had led many of
the judges to consider the whole question of the relation of Eng-
lish law to international law; and that the trend of legal opinion
was moving in the direction of asserting the broad principle that
international law is part of the law of England.' It would, I think,
have been admitted that, if a statute or a rule of the common law
conflicted with a rule of international law, an English judge must
decide in accordance with the statute or the rule of the common
law. 4 But, if English law was silent, it was the opinion of both
Lord Mansfield and Blackstone that a settled rule of international
law must be considered to be part of English law, and enforced
as such.
During the late eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries this
view of the relation of English to international law continued to
be held by many distinguished lawyers. In 1792, Serjeant Hill's
opinion in favour of the Crown's power to extradite criminals,
was partly grounded upon this view.5 He thought that there was
a rule of international law that a sovereign ought to extradite
criminals, and that therefore the Crown must possess this power.
In 1805 Lord Eldon, in the case of Dolder v. Huntiigfield,
lays it down, in effect, that where a question is not concluded by
a rule of English law, and is one to which international law
applies, the courts must apply the principles of international law.
The question at issue in that case was whether stock vested in
trustees for the Swiss government could be claimed by a new
Swiss government, which had, by a revolution, superseded by
the old government, though the new government had not been
recognized by England. This he said was "a question to be
discussed upon great principles of the law of nations;"' and he
distinguished it from the questions arising in the case of Barclay
v. Russelll as to property belonging to the colony of Maryland
before the war of independence. The colony was, as Lord Eldon
said, "only a corporation under the great seal dissolved by means
310 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 371-373.
410 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 372. note 7. See infra,
pp. 150-152.
510 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 399.
6(1805) 11 Ves. 283.
-(1805) 11 Ves. 283, 294: he did not decide the point as the question
at issue in the case was one of pleading only.
8(1797) 3 Ves. 424; for a good account of this case and the case of
Dolder v. Huntingfield, see Moore, Act of State in English Law 157-161
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which a court of justice was obliged to consider rebellious ;'* and
therefore the questions in that case fell to be decided by the rules
of English law. In 1817, in the case of Wolff v. Oxholmn,20 Lord
Ellenborough made an elaborate examination of the rules of inter-
national law as to the right to confiscate enemy property, in order
to come to a decision as to the validity of a Danish ordinance con-
fiscating the property and debts due to British subjects-thus
in effect recognising that the rules of international law should be
given effect to by the Law of England. In 1823, in the case of
Novello v. Toogood,1" which turned on the immunity of the house
of an ambassador's servant, Abbott C. J. said that the Act of Anne
"must be construed according to the common law, of which the
law of nations must be deemed a part."' 2 In the same year the lass,
officers of the Crown' 3 gave it as their opinion that "subscriptions
in favour of one of two belligerent states, being inconsistent with
the neutrality declared by the government of the country and with
the law of nations would be illegal, and subject the parties con-
cerned in them to prosecution for a misdemeanor."' 4 In the follow-
ing year, in the case of De Wutz v. Hendricks," Best C. J. held
that this was the law. He said:
c*'.. it occurred to me at the trial that it was contrary to the
law of nations (which in all cases of international law is adopted
into the municipal code of every civilized country) for persons in
England to enter into engagements to raise money to support the
subjects of a government in amity with our own, in hostilities
against their government, and that no right of action would arise
out of such a transaction."' 6
In 1861, in the case of The Emperor of Austria v. Da3,'x- the
principle was recognised and restated. In 1853 Lord Lyndhurst
said, "the offense of endeavouring to excite revolt against a neigh-
bouring state is an offense against the law of nations. No writer
on the law of nations states otherwise. But the law of nations,
according to the decision of our greatest judges, is part of the
9(1805) 11 Ves. 283, 294.10(1817) 6 M. & S. 92, 100-106.
-1(1823) 1 B. & C. 554, 2 Dow & Ry. K. B. 833, 1 L. J. (O.S.) K. B.
181.
18 2(1823) 1 B. & C. 554, 562, 2 Dow & Ry. C B. 833, 1 L. J. (O.S.)
K. B. 181.
'3R. Gifford A. G., and J. S. Copley S. G.
24(1823) 2 State Tr. (N.S.) 1016.
15(1824) 2 Bing. 314, 9 'Moore, C. P. 586, 2 State Tr. (N.S.) 125.
16(1824) 2 Bing. 314, 315-6, 9 Moore, C. P. 586, 2 State Tr. (N.S.) 125.
.7(1861) 3 De G. F. and J. 217, 244, 30 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 690, 4 L. T.
494. 7 Jur. (N.S.) 639, 9 W. R. 712, per Lord Campbell L. C., cited below
p. 148, note 38.
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law of England;" and this statement was concurred in by Lords
Brougham, Truro, and Cranworth.18 In 1861 Stuart, V. C. held
that, because international law was part of the law of England, the
Court of Chancery could, by means of an injunction, protect the
public rights of foreign sovereigns." In 1876 Sir R. Phillimore,
Mr. M'ountague Bernard, and Sir Henry Maine were of opinion
that English courts were justified in applying modern rules of
international law; that these modern rules condemned slavery;
and that therefore the captain of a British ship of war, in the
port of a state which allowed slavery, was justified in refusing
to give up a slave who had taken refuge on his vessel.2'
The whole question as to the relation of English to international
law was elaborately argued before all the judges in the court of
Crown Cases Reserved in the case of Regina v. KC3,n2 in 1876.
The accused, a German, was the captain of The Franconia. He
negligently ran down The Strathclyde, and, as a result of the col-
lision, a passenger on the latter vessel was killed. His act, accord-
ing to English law, amounted to manslaughter. The question before
the court was whether an English court had jurisdiction to try him.
Since the collision occurred within the three mile limit, that ques-
tion depended upon whether the English courts would recognise
1SLewis, Foreign Jurisdiction 66-7.
1 9
"The regulation of the coin and currency of any State is a great
prerogative right of the sovereign power. It is not a mere municipal right.
or a mere question of municipal law, but a great public right recognized and
protected by the law of nations. A public right recognized by the law of
nations is a legal right, because the law of nations is part of the conunon
law of England .... The friendly relations between civilized countries re-
quire for their safety the protection by municipal law of those existing
sovereign rights recognized by the law of nations," Emperor of Austria v.
Day, (1861) 30 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 690, 700; we shall see, (below) pp. 148,
149, that this decision, so far as it rested on those grounds, was overruled by
the court of appeal.
20"International law, it is to be observed, is not stationary; it admits
of progressive improvement, though the improvement is more difficult and
slower than that of municipal law, and though the agencies by which change
is effected are different. It varies with the progress of opinion and the
growth of usage; and there is no subject on which so great a change of
opinion has taken place as slavery and the slave trade. . . . The trade in
Negro slaves, which was formerly competed for as a legitimate source of
profit, has in a great number of treaties been assimilated to the crime of
piracy. These considerations are sufficient to justify Great Britain in
instructing her officers not to enforce slave laws, or permit them to be
enforced, on board her ships of war in foreign territorial waters." Royal
Commission on Fugitive Slaves xxv; on the whole of this subject see 2
Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 43-58; Stephen
was one of the commissioners, and reprints his memorandum, contained in
the Report, in his history.
21(1876) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41 J. P. 517. 13 Cox C. C.
403; see also 2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883)
29-42.
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the rule of international law that the sea within that limit was for
all purposes part of the territory to which it was adjacent. A
minority of the judges2 2 held that, since international law is part
of the law of England, and since international law recognised this
three mile limit, the court had jurisdiction. That the views of
these judges were substantially in accordance with the views of
Lord Mansfield and Blackstone, and with the later decisions and
dicta which follow these views, can be seen from a comparison
between the words used by Blackstone in his Commentaries, and
by Lord Coleridge C. J. in this case. Blackstone says :23
"The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural
reason, and established by universal consent among the civilized
inhabitants of the world. ... This general law is founded on this
principle, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one
another all the good they can; and, in time of war, as little harm
as possible, without prejudice to their own real interests. And,
as none of these states will allow a superiority in the other, there-
fore neither can dictate or prescribe the rules of this law to the
rest; but such rules must necessarily result from those principles
of natural justice, in which all the learned of every nation agree;
or they depend upon mutual compacts or treaties between the
respective communities; in the construction of which there is
also no judge to resort to, but the law of nature and reason, being
the only one in which all the contracting parties are equally con-
versant, and to which they are equally subject. In arbitrary states
this law, wherever it contradicts or is not provided for by the
municipal law of the country, is enforced by the royal power; but
since in England no royal power can introduce a new law, or
suspend the execution of the old, therefore the law of nations
(wherever any question arises which is properly the object of
its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the common
law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land."
Lord Coleridge, C. J., after saying that the dominion of a state
over its territorial waters was "established as solidly as any propo-
sition of international law can be," proceeded as follows:
"Law implies a law giver, and a tribunal capable of enforcing
it and coercing its transgressors. But there is no common law-
giver to sovereign states; and no tribunal has power to bind them
by decrees or coerce them if they transgress. The law of nations is
that collection of usages which civilized states have agreed to
observe in their dealings with one another. What these usages are,
whether a particular one has or has not been agreed to, must be
matter of evidence. Treaties and acts of state are but evidence
of the agreement of nations, and do not in this country at least
-
2 Lord Coleridge C. J., Brett and Amnphlett J. J. A., Grove, Denman,
and Lindley, J. J.
234 BI. Comm. 66-67.
MIINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
per se bind the tribunals. Neither, certainly, does a consensus of
jurists; but it is evidence of the agreement of nations onl inter-
national points; and on such points, when they arise, the English
courts give effect, as part of English law, to such agreement."2 1
But the judges who thus followed the Mansfield and Black-
stone tradition on this matter were in a minority. Cockburn C.J.,
who delivered the leading judgment on the opposing side, and
the majority of the judges, 2 ' held that only those parts of inter-
national law are part of English law which could be proved to
have been received into English law. That reception might be
effected by statute incorporating a rule of international law, or it
might be proved by the assent of the nations who were bound
by international law to the particular rule.
"This assent may be express as by treaty, or the acknowledged
concurrence of governments, or may be implied from established
usage-an instance of which is to be found in the fact that
merchant vessels on the high seas are held to be subject only to the
law of the nation under whose flag they sail, while in the ports of
a foreign state they are subject to the local law as well as to that
of their own country. In the absence of proof of assent derived
from one or other of these sources, no unanimity on the part of
theoretical writers would warrant the judicial application of the
law on the sole authority of their views and statements."' "
In other words, it is not true to say that all the rules of inter-
national law, as and when they are evolved by the jurists, become
part of English law; but only those parts which, by legislation,
judicial decision, or established practice, have been received into
English law. The mere fact that there was a unanimous con-
sensus of jurists in favour of a particular rule did not (as the
judges who took the opposite view held) make that rule a rule
of international law, which must, without more, be enforced as
part of the law of England. Since there was no evidence that all
the states bound by international law had assented to the rule
that a state has jurisdiction over its territorial waters,27 this was
not a rule which could be enforced as part of the law of England.
The assent of the jurists may, indeed, make it reasonable for
Parliament to legislate so as to give effect to their views. But
"it is obviously one thing to say that the legislature of a nation
-4Regina v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 153-4, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41
J. P. 517, 13 Cox C. C. 403.
-. Cockburn C. J., Kelly C. B., Bramwell J. A., Lush and Field J. J.,
Sir R. Phillimore, and Pollock B.
2oRegina v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 202-3, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41I
J. P. 517, 13 Cox C. C. 403.
-7Regina v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 203-7, 46 L. J. M. C. 17. 41
J. P. 517, 13 Cox C. C. 403.
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may, from the common assent of other nations, have acquired the
full right to legislate over a part of that which was before high
sea, and as such common to all the world; another and a very
different thing to say that the lav of the local state becomes thereby
at once, without anything more, applicable to foreigners within
such part, or that, independently of legislation, the courts of tile
local state can proprio vigore so apply it."'2s
As Stephen points out, we can see the same divergence of
opinion as to the relation of international law to English law in the
report of the Royal Commission on Fugitive Slaves. "  Cockburn,
C. J. differed from the opinion expressed by Phillimore, Bernard,
Maine that the development of rules of international law per se
modified the rules of English law,30 and expressed the opinion
that no such modification could take place without some evidence
that these developed rules had been received into and become a part
of English law.- This view in effect amounts to saying that inter-
national law is not so much a part, as a source, of English law.
In each case in which the question arises the court must consider
whether the particular rule of international law has been received
into, and so become a source of, English law.32
The Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878 gave the courts
the jurisdiction which the minority of judges in this case had held
that they possessed;3 and its declaratory form is some evidence
that the Legislature considered that their views were correct.
Nevertheless I think that the opinion of Cockburn, C. J., and the
majority of the judges had come to be more in accord with the
principles of modern English law than the opinion of the minority
which represents the older view that international law is per se
part of the law of England. The reasons for this change are
mainly three-the manner in which these questions came before
the courts, a growing perception of the differences in the char-
2 Regina v. Keyn, (1876) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 207, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41
J. P. 517, 13 Cox C. C. 403.
292 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England (1883) 44.
30Above, p. 144.
31
"The principles of international law laid down by Lord Stowell re-
main the same: so far as we kmow, no compact or understanding has been
come to since between our own and other governments inconsistent with
them; and with regard to exterritoriality as now contended for, I deny,
in the first place, that there is any proof that it has in point of fact been
generally acquiesced in; and I venture, with all due deference, to think that
it would be no improvement on the law of nations if it had. And I must
here, in passing, observe that no improvement in our own views on any
principle of international law will justify us in forcing the law. as we view
it, on another state, which does not take the same view that we do," Royal
Commission on Fugitive Slaves xxxvi.
32(1935) 51 L. Quart. Rev. 24, 31.
3341-42 Vic. Ch. 73.
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acter and ambit of the rules of international and the rules of
municipal law, and the course of legislation. Let us look briefly
at the matter from these three points of view.
In the first place, though many judges and jurists had laid
it down in broad terms that international law is part of the law of
England, 4 these broad statements were merely prefaces to the
ruling in particular cases, which turned upon the application of a
particular rule of international law to cases concerning the im-
munities of foreign sovereigns or ambassadors, questions as to
the criminal liability of subjects for breaches of truces, or for
raising subscriptions or doing other acts to help revolutions against
friendly powers, or questions arising in civil actions in which
the existence of some rule of international law was relevant to
the issues in the case. Thus the attention of the judges was
concentrated upon the question whether a particular rule, alleged
to be a rule of international law, and as such part of the law of
England, was in fact a rule of international law. They were
obliged therefore to scrutinize the evidence as to whether that
particular rule had been received as a rule of international law.
The influence of this mental attitude is very obvious in the judg-
ments of Cockburn, C. J., and the other judges who agreed with
him. In the second place, the growing perception of the differences
between the character and ambit of the rules of international and
the rules of municipal law, led the courts to distinguish between
rights and duties enforceable in a municipal court, and rights and
duties which though not so enforceable, were yet recognised by
international law. Thus in Barclay v. Russell, Lord Loughborough
distinguished between political equities which might be made "the
foundation of representations to be made from state to state," and
judicial equities.': In The Emperor of Austria v. lay ' l.ord
Campbell and Turner, L. J., denied the truth of the principle laid
down by Stuart, V. C., in the court below, that since international
law was part of the law of England, and since the Emperor of
Austria's prerogative rights were recognised by international law,
the Court of Chancery could interfere to protect those rights by
injunction.17 Turner, L. J., said :
3410 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 371-3; above, pp. 142-144.
3r,(1797) 3 Ves. 424. 435.
36(1861) 3 De G. F. and J. 217, 30 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 690, 4 L. J. 494. 7
Jur. (N.S.) 639, 9 W. R. 712.37Above, p. 144 and note 19.
38Emperor of Austria v. Day, (1861) 3 De G. F. and J. 217. 251-2. 30
L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 690, 4 L. J. 494, 7 Jur. (N.S.) 639, 9 W. R. 712; cf. thejudgment of Lord Campbell, L. C., at pp. 231-2; it appears that counsel for
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"The prerogative rights of sovereigns seem to me . . . to stand
very much on the same footing as acts of state and matters of that
description, with which the municipal courts of this country do
not and cannot interfere. Such acts and matters are recognised by
international law no less than the prerogative rights of sovereigns;
but the municipal courts of this country have disclaimed all right
to interfere vith respect to them. If the subject of one state
infringes the prerogative of the sovereign of another state, the
remedy, as I apprehend, lies in an appeal by the offended sovereign
to the sovereign of the state to which the offender belongs."
It is true that helping to plot revolution against the sovereign
of a friendly state is a misdemeanour. To that extent English law
recognises and enforces international obligations." But English
law stops short of giving a remedy in its courts to a foreign sover-
eign who complains of the infringement of his sovereign rights.
In the third place, this attitude of mind was helped by the course
of legislation in regard to topics which touch upon the rules of
international law. In the Middle Ages, before international law
had become a definite system, there had been legislation against
breakers of truces and safe-conducts.40  The statute of 1708y,4
which dealt with the immunities of ambassadors, though said by
Lord Mansfield and others to be only declaratory of the common
law,12 really introduced this principle of international law into the
common law, and for the first time provided penalties for its
breach.4 3 Later, the statutes dealing with such subjects as foreign
enlistment and extradition made certain topics connected with
international law part of English law. In these circumstances it is
possible to understand Cockburn, C. J.'s refusal to supply by
judicial action "the absence of actual legislation.""4
the plaintiff admitted in the court of appeal that they could not base their
claim for an injunction on an invasion of the Emperor's prerogatives.39Above, p. 143; "fitting out a warlike expedition in England to bring
about a revolution in the dominions of a sovereign in alliance with Queen
Victoria would certainly amount to a misdemeanor . . . and the manu-
facture of twenty tons of promissory notes for the same purpose may
amount to the same offence," Emperor of Austria v. Day, (1S61) 3 De G. F.
and J. 217, 244, 30 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 690, 4 L. J. 494, 7 Jur. (N.S.) 639, 9
W. R. 712.
402 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 473-474; 4 BI. Comm.
68-70.
417 Anne, ch. 12; 10 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 370-
371.
4210 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 372.
4310 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 369-371.
44
"The question is whether, acting judicially, we can treat the power
of Parliament to legislate as making up for the absence of actual legislation.
I am clearly of opinion that we cannot," Regina v. Keyn, (1877) 2 Ex. Div.
63, 208, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41 J. P. 517, 13 Cox C. C. 403; with this view
Stephen agrees, 2 History of Criminal Law of England (1883) 41-42.
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The view taken by Cockburn C. J. and the majority of the
court in Regina v. Keyn is the view which has prevailed. This
is clear from the case of West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. v.
Rex. 45 Lord Alverstone C. J. delivering the judgment of the
court said :"G
"The proposition . . . that international law forms part of the
law of England. requires a word of explanation and comment.
It is quite true that whatever has received the common consent of
civilized nations must have received the assent of our country, and
that to which we have assented along with other nations in general
may properly be called international law, and as such will be
acknowledged and applied by our municipal tribunals when legiti-
mate occasion arises for those tribunals to decide questions to
which doctrines of international law may be relevant. But any
doctrine so invoked must be one really accepted as binding be-
tween nations, and the international law sought to be applied
must, like anything else, be proved by satisfactory evidence, which
must show either that the particular proposition put forward has
been recognised and acted upon by our own country, or that it is
of such a nature, and has been so widely and generally accepted.
that it can hardly be supposed that any civilized state would re-
pudiate it. The mere opinions of jurists, however eminent or
learned, that it ought to be so recognised, are not in themselves
sufficient."
Moreover there is another condition which must be satisfied
before a rule of international law can be accepted by the courts
as a part of English law-a condition which also applies to all
exercises of any of the prerogatives of the crown. That is the
condition that the rule of international law must not conflict with
a rule of English law. If it conflicts with a rule of English law
no effect can be given to it. In Regina v. Keynm Cockburn, C. J.,
held, in effect, that, by the rules of English law, the English
courts had no jurisdiction over the offences of foreigners (not
being part of the crew of a British ship) committed by them on
the high seas; that English law had never recognised that the
English state had a general dominion over territorial waters: that,
except for special purposes defined by statute, it held such terri-
torial waters to be part of the high seas; and that therefore to
assert a criminal jurisdiction over a foreigner in the case before the
court would amount to changing the law of England. Even if all
45[1905] 2 K. B. 391, 74 L. J. K. B. 753, 93 L. T. 207, 53 NV. R. 660,
21 T. L. R. 562. 49 Sol. Jo. 552.
46[19051 2 K. B. 391. 406-407, 74 L. J. K. B. 753, 93 L. T. 207, 53 W. R.
660, 21 T. L. R. 562, 49 Sol. Jo. 552.
47(1877) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 46 L. J. M. C. 17, 41 J. P. 517. 13 Cox C. C.
403.
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other nations could be proved to have assented to this jurisdiction,
such assent would not
"be sufficient to authorize the tribunals of this country to apply,
without an Act of Parliament, what would practically amount to a
new law .... The assent of nations is doubtless sufficient to give
the power of parliamentary legislation in a matter otherwise within
the sphere of international law; but it would be powerless to
confer without such legislation a jurisdiction beyond and unknown
to the law, such as that now insisted on, a jurisdiction over for-
eigners in foreign ships on a portion of the high seas."14 6
It may perhaps be thought that the limitations and conditions
placed by English law on the recognition .of the rules of inter-
national law, which flow from the view that international law is
not a part, but a source, of English law, are unduly restrictive. In
particular cases this may be so. Thus the law, as it existed before
the Foreign Enlistment Act, 1870, was inadequate to prevent
breaches of neutrality; and the result was that this country was
involved in heavy liabilities for the damage caused by these
breaches. But generally this state of the law has not been found
to be inconvenient. There are two reasons for this. In the first
place, the Legislature has always been willing to intervene to bring
English law into harmony with the latest developments of inter-
national law. In the second place some of the results of the mean-
ing given to acts of state in English law enable the Crown, by
virtue of its wide prerogative over foreign affairs, to give effect
to the rules of international law provided that they do not conflict
with the rules of English law. For instance the Crown can recog-
nise the status of a foreign sovereign or a foreign public ship, and
thereby confer the immunity which is given by the rules of inter-
national law.
Lastly it should be noted that these doctrines as to the relation
of English law to international law are the doctrines which are
applied by the ordinary courts of law and equity. The position
of the Prize Court, which administers international law, ' is
different. It is bound by a statute; so that, if a statute compels a
departure from the rules of international law, the court must
decide in accordance with the statute. .0 But, if the decision in
the case of The Zamora5 is correct, it is not bound by an Order
4S(1877) 2 Ex. Div. 63, 203, 46 L. J. M1. C. 17, 41 J. P. 517, 13 Cox
C. C. 403.
49Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 1, pp. 565, 566; vol. 12, pp.
653, 654, 670, 693.
501 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 566.
51[1916] 2 A. C. 77, 85 L. J. P. 89, 114 L. T. 626, 32 T. L.- R. 436, 60
Sol. Jo. 416, 13 Asp. M. L. C. 330.
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in Council which purports to alter a rule of international law,
whether or not it is a rule of international law which has been
accepted by the common law, 52-a proposition which I have given
reasons for thinking is as doubtful in law as it is politically in-
expedient. 3
521916] 2 A. C. 77, 90-94, 85 L. J. P. 89, 114 L. T. 626, 32 T. L. R.
436, 60 Sol. Jo. 416, 13 Asp. M. L. C. 330.
531 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1938) 567.
